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Abstract 
Awarding design-build (DB) contracts before a complete subsurface investigation is completed, 
makes mitigating the risk of differing site conditions difficult, if not impossible. The purpose of 
the study was to identify effective practices for managing geotechnical risk in DB projects, and it 
reports the results of a survey that included responses from 42 of 50 US state departments of 
transportation and a content analysis of DB requests for proposals from 26 states to gauge the 
client’s perspective, as well as 11 structured interviews with DB contractors to obtain the 
perspective from the other side of the DB contract.  A suite of DB geotechnical risk manage 
tools is presented based on the results of the analysis. Effective practices were found in three 
areas: enhancing communications on geotechnical issues before final proposals are submitted; 
the use of project-specific differing site conditions clauses; and expediting geotechnical design 
reviews after award. The major finding is that contract verbiage alone is not sufficient to transfer 
the risk of changed site conditions. The agency must actively communicate all the geotechnical 
information on hand at the time of the DB procurement and develop a contract strategy that 
reduces/retires the risk of geotechnical uncertainty as expeditiously as possible after award. 
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Introduction 
“Geotechnical engineering is fundamentally about managing risk” (Ho et al., 2000). Managing 
the risk of geotechnical site conditions is never simple; however, when a DB (also termed 
“design and build” in many countries) contract is awarded before a complete subsurface 
investigation is complete; it becomes even more difficult (Perkins, 2009). In the US, recent 
government pressure to expedite the delivery of highway construction projects to address the 
current infrastructure deterioration crisis has created a procurement environment where DB 
projects are being awarded as soon as environmental consents can be obtained without regard 
to the potential impact of failing to quantify and mitigate geotechnical risk on post-award project 
cost and schedule (Mendez, 2010; Hatem, 2011; Federal, 2013). 
 
The US Federal Highway Administration’s (FHWA) Special Experimental Projects No. 14 – 
Alternative Contracting (SEP-14) was introduced in 1990 and by 2009 had authorized over 400 
DB highway projects (Federal, 2006). A decade later, the FHWA announced its “Every Day 
Counts” (EDC) initiative to address the rapid renewal of the nation’s rapidly deteriorating 
infrastructure. The program is designed to accelerate the implementation of innovative practices 
that are immediately available as described by the current FHWA Administrator, Victor Mendez. 
 
“Our society and our industry face an unprecedented list of [infrastructure] challenges. 
Because of our economy, we need to work more efficiently... But it’s not enough to simply 
address those challenges. We need to do it with a new sense of urgency. It’s that 
quality— urgency—that I’ve tried to capture in our initiative, Every Day Counts.” (Mendez, 
2010; italics added). 
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Replacing traditional design-bid-build (DBB) with DB project delivery is one of the tools being 
specifically encouraged by the EDC program. A report to the US Congress on the effectiveness 
of DB in highway construction reviewed every project authorized under SEP-14 and found that 
on average DB “reduced the overall duration of their projects by 14 per cent, reduced the total 
cost of the project by 3 per cent, and maintained the same level of quality as compared to DBB” 
(Federal, 2006). The same report also concluded that clients select DB primarily as a means to 
accelerate a project’s schedule, validating a trend reported nearly a decade earlier by Songer 
and Molenaar (1996).  Higbee (2004) found that the major hurdle to achieving an accelerated 
schedule in DB is the client’s approval to release the design for construction. The geotechnical 
investigation and subsequent foundation design is often the first design package that must be 
released. Since geotechnical uncertainty is often high at the time of DB contract award, the 
design-builder’s geotechnical designers are under pressure to complete their work as quickly as 
practical to allow foundation and other subsurface construction to begin.  
 
The 2006 Report to Congress found that less than 3 per cent of total highway projects were 
delivered using DB (Federal, 2006) and, because DB transport projects could only be delivered 
after obtaining FHWA permission via the SEP-14 application process, the overall impact of 
managing geotechnical risk has been low on a nation-wide, programmatic basis. DB contracting 
could not be described as a “routine” method to deliver construction projects. That changed in 
2007 when the FHWA DB contracting “final rule” was ratified by the US Congress (Federal, 
2007), making it  fully eligible for delivering federally-funded projects. The impact was profound 
with the number of states authorized by their own state legislatures to use DB growing from 33, 
at the time of the 2006 Report to Congress, to 47 today (Design 2013). The growth in DB usage 
was further spurred in 2012 by the passage of Public Law 112-141, the Moving Ahead for 
Progress in the 21st Century Act (MAP-21), which reduced the state funding share of federal-aid 
highway projects delivered using DB from 10 per cent to 5 per cent (Federal 2013). Thus, a 
substantial financial incentive has been provided to state transport agencies that have 
previously chosen not to implement DB. The political pressure to implement DB is further 
increased by the FHWA EDC program objective of increasing the number of projects delivered 
using DB by 50% by 2014 (Mendez, 2010).  
 
From the public agency geotechnical engineer’s perspective, the net result will be to increase 
the number of DB projects awarded before subsurface investigations are complete. From the 
design-builder’s perspective, increased geotechnical risk will translate into higher contingencies 
included in proposed prices to mitigate those risks from the contractor’s perspective 
(Christensen and Meeker, 2002). Higher prices translate to higher potential that the agencies 
will ultimately not have sufficient budget to actually award the DB project once the proposals 
have been opened. Therefore, successfully managing the geotechnical risk during the 
procurement phase of a DB project becomes essential to being able to award the given project 
within its budget (Clark and Borst, 2002). Accordingly, the researchers address the following 
questions: 
 What measures can a public transport agency take to manage geotechnical risk during 
the DB procurement process? 
 What can be done after the award of the DB contract to mitigate and retire geotechnical 
risk in an expeditious manner? 
 
The answers to these questions found in the study are synthesized into a set of geotechnical 
risk management tools that can be used by public clients to better allocate geotechnical risk 
among DB project stakeholders. Additionally, the authors provide construction procurement 
researchers a platform from which to support future research on optimizing DB procurement risk 
with the need to accelerate project delivery of transport projects. 
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Background 
The current emphasis on accelerated project delivery in the US creates an environment where 
public engineers may be forced to focus on expediting the procurement process rather than fully 
developing the project’s geotechnical requirements.  This includes evaluating how much of the 
geotechnical investigation should be done by the design-builder after contract award. The 
geotechnical investigation decision has a number of ramifications, including the level of liability 
for the underground conditions that can be transferred along with the geotechnical investigation 
and design responsibility for the foundation/subsurface design.  
 
Risk-based Geotechnical Design 
The FHWA introduced risk-based geotechnical design in 1987 when it published the 
Geotechnical Risk Analysis User’s Guide developed by G.B. Baecher. This document moved 
geotechnical design on federally-funded highway projects away from a set of “conservative 
factors of safety” and toward modelling uncertainty on a project-specific basis via a statistically 
determined reliability index. This shift was necessary because a “fixed factor of safety implies a 
different likelihood of failure” in each project and creates a situation where “the overall factor of 
safety in a design is unknown” (Baecher, 1987). Baecher’s work assumed that the project would 
be delivered using DBB project delivery and the data used as input for the risk-based design 
would spring from a thorough program of geotechnical investigation, testing, and analysis. An 
Australian study of the implications of inadequate site investigations agreed with Baecher’s 
assertion regarding communicating geotechnical uncertainty and recommended that 
geotechnical uncertainty be expressed using statistical measures such as confidence limits. 
Jaksa (2002) argues that doing so permits “any other engineer utilizing these values, as well as 
the client, to appreciate the uncertainty associated with the parameters and, hence, 
appropriately account for them in the design process.” The ability to understand the amount of 
as-designed geotechnical risk is one key to effectively managing that risk after award. A critical 
discourse on the subject of quantifying geotechnical risk in the design asserted that “designers 
sometimes wishfully classify those factors which they cannot confidently characterize as being 
of minor importance, or hope that such imponderables would be compensated by conservatism 
built in the system elsewhere” (Ho et al., 2000). This notion also agrees Baecher’s findings 
regarding the weakness of using fixed factors of safety.  Ho et al. go on to advocate the use of 
quantitative risk assessment in conjunction with traditional deterministic methods to better 
communicate geotechnical risk throughout the project’s design and construction process. Van 
Straveren (2000) builds on the quantitative risk analysis theme and extends the argument to 
actively managing geotechnical risk across a project’s entire life cycle with a focus on 
articulating risk during procurement and cited a “1:10 cost-benefit ratio…as a result of better 
contracting practices by improved risk allocation.” 
 
Oberguggenberger and Fellin (2002) take an opposing view of the value of statistically-based 
geotechnical risk analysis. Their opinion is founded in theoretical mathematics rather than 
geotechnical engineering design. While they recognize the role of failure probabilities and safety 
factors in comparative analysis of design options, they state that “these numerical values do not 
make quantitative assertions about reality… the failure probability cannot be interpreted as a 
frequency of failure.” While their proof of the superiority of fuzzy sets over probability-based risk 
analysis appears to be eloquent, it is also arcane requiring an understanding of mathematics at 
a level beyond the academic preparation of most practicing geotechnical engineers, an 
argument made by Ho et al. (2000). Those authors contended that resistance to the increased 
knowledge required to move from deterministic to probabilistic geotechnical risk analysis, much 
less fuzzy set theory, “is by no means easy to resolve... [requiring] appropriate grounding of the 
basic concepts [of statistical risk analysis] in university education and focused professional 
training…” Thus, while Oberguggenberger and Fellin’s approach may produce a better means 
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to model geotechnical uncertainty, it must be regarded as impractical due to the need to 
educate a significant number of engineers, an idea supported by Baynes (2010).  
 
Baynes plays heavily on the human factor and finds that total geotechnical risk is a combination 
of the technical conditions and the competence of the project staff. In fact, “the project staff may 
actually be the largest source [of risk].” Baynes emphasizes the need to educate and train 
project staff to “manage and mitigate the geotechnical risks, rather than generate them.” He, like 
van Straveren (2000), also stresses the need to manage geotechnical risk throughout the 
project’s life cycle, specifically identifying the procurement phase as a point where “inadequate 
understanding of the importance of ground conditions results in poor acquisition… [that] leads to 
claims based on contractually unforeseen ground conditions” (Baynes, 2010). To summarize the 
literature, geotechnical risk management is more than the use of sophisticated statistical models 
to quantify the risk in probabilistic terms. It must be continually evaluated as an integral part of 
the project development decision-making process (Baecher, 1987; Ho et al., 2000; van 
Staveren, 2000; Baynes, 2010). All of the above literature was written in the DBB context where 
the procurement was based on a completed geotechnical design that was in turn based on 
subsurface investigation. The issue of subsurface risk becomes weightier when the 
geotechnical investigation moves from being a condition precedent to DBB construction contract 
award to a deliverable required after award of a DB contract. 
 
Design-build Contracting 
DB project delivery has proven itself to be one method to accelerate the construction, 
reconstruction, and rehabilitation of aging, structurally deficient infrastructure (Federal, 2006). 
DB also allows the public transport agency to shift some of the responsibility for completing the 
geotechnical investigations necessary to support the geotechnical design to the design-builder 
after the award of the DB contract. This creates a different risk profile than when the project 
client has full responsibility for design (and hence geotechnical investigations) in a traditional 
DBB project (Loulakis et al., 1995).  
 
The FHWA mandates the use of a Differing Site Conditions (DSC) clause for DBB projects on 
federal aid highway projects, unless the use of such a clause is contrary to state law (Loulakis et 
al., 1995). The DSC clause provides broad relief to a contractor for physical conditions that 
materially differ from what is anticipated by the contract.  FHWA does not, however, have the 
same mandate for DB projects.  Instead, FHWA encourages state DOTs to use these clauses 
when appropriate for the risk and responsibilities that are shared with the design-builder. 
 
On DBB projects, the risk of differing site conditions is almost always the responsibility of the 
client (Tufenkjian, 2007), based on the contract’s DSC clause and prevailing case law (Higbee, 
2004). Diekmann, et al. (1987) confirmed this point specifically for infrastructure projects.  On 
DB projects, the risk of differing site conditions is not as clear (Clark and Borst, 2002).  The DB 
contract can be awarded before a full geotechnical site investigation is made by either the client 
or the winning design-builder (Smith, 2008).  This leads to a question of how to identify an 
appropriate reference point for implementing the DSC clause if one is included in the contract 
(Hatem, 2011).  There is also a policy question for the agency as to how much information it 
should furnish about the geotechnical site conditions (Blanchard, 2007; Dwyre et al., 2010). The 
more information that is provided, the more likely it is that the design-builder can submit a 
competitive price proposal since it is able to reduce the contingencies contained in the price 
proposal for geotechnical uncertainty (Christensen and Meeker, 2002). Additionally, this will 
enable the agency to have a better sense of its program and expected costs.  However, 
because the DB delivery method has proven to be an effective means of compressing project 
delivery periods to their shortest states (FHWA, 2006), there is frequently an incentive for the 
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agency to start the procurement process before a robust geotechnical program has been 
performed (Higbee, 2004; Kim et al., 2009).   
 
Pre-award Geotechnical Risk Distribution 
Given the above, an agency should first address whether or not a given project is a good 
candidate for DB project delivery in the context of the geotechnical conditions’ impact on the 
preliminary design, price, and time.  Table 1 is a synopsis of the risk profiles for DBB and DB 
found in Koch et al. (2010) and adapted for geotechnical risks.  One can see that the major 
change in the risk profile is due to the shift in design responsibility to the design-builder. The 
client’s new DB risks result in many cases from failing to relinquish the design responsibility to 
the design-builder. The client’s DB scope risk for geotechnical design review comments and/or 
directives is an example of this. Direct and tacit approval of constructive changes to the 
geotechnical design during construction is another example. 
 
 Contractor/Design-Builder Client 
Geotechnical Scope Risk 
DBB  Warranties and Guarantees 
 Latent Defects - Workmanship 
 Competent Geotechnical 
Construction Personnel Available 
 Design Error and Omissions 
 Latent Defects - Design 
 Direct & Tacit Approval of Constructive Changes to 
Design 
DB  Design Errors & Omissions 
 Warranties & Guarantees 
 Latent Defects  - Design & 
Workmanship 
 Competent Geotechnical Design 
Personnel Available  
 Clear Geotechnical Scope Definition 
 Direct & Tacit Approval of Constructive Changes to 
Geotechnical Design 
 Geotechnical Design Review Comments & 
Directives 
 Technical Review Capability 
 Geotechnical Cost Risk 
DBB  Rework 
 Subcontractor Default 
 Market Fluctuation after Award 
 Redesign and Resultant Rework  
 Construction Contract Amount  
 Market Fluctuation During Design - Material & Labor 
DB  Redesign & Rework 
 Subcontractor Default 
 Market Fluctuation During Design -
Material & Labor 
 Design-Build Contract Amount 
 Prompt Payment 
 Design-Builder Default 
 
 Geotechnical Schedule Risk 
DBB  Contract Completion Date 
 Liquidated Damages 
 Timely Design Completion 
 Client Furnished Property  Delivery 
DB  Delivery on Approved Schedule 
 Fast-Track Geotechnical Rework 
 Liquidated Damages 
 Unrealistic Schedule 
 Timely Geotechnical Design Approvals Client 
Furnished Property Delivery 
Table 1 DBB versus DB risk profiles 
 
Hatem (2011) maintains that DB geotechnical uncertainty “is always high until the post-award 
site investigation and geotechnical design report can be completed.” The geotechnical/site 
engineering is the first major design package that must be released to get construction started 
(Higbee 2004) and competing design-builders must base their schedule estimates on 
expeditiously completing this key design task (Centennial, 2004). Given the criticality of the 
geotechnical investigation and design to DB project success, the inclusion of proposal 
evaluation criteria specifically addressing the competing proposers’ approach to project 
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geotechnical issues, ensures that the competing design-builders will focus on those aspects of 
the project in the proposal because if they do not, their proposal will be found to be 
nonresponsive (Higbee, 2004). 
 
The Washington State DOT (WSDOT) Guidebook for Design-Build Highway Project 
Development (2004) maintains that the agency is “responsible for establishing the scope, 
project definition, design criteria, performance measurements, and existing conditions of the site 
(initial geotechnical investigation, subsurface conditions).” The responsibilities listed in this 
passage form a foundation for determining what specific data should be included in the DB 
RFP. This agency agrees with Hung et al. (2009) and goes on to elaborate that “it is necessary 
for WSDOT to establish a baseline for design-builders to develop their technical and price 
proposals” and that “preliminary geotechnical investigations will be conducted by WSDOT with 
data provided to Proposers.”  
 
WSDOT is consciously creating an environment of open communication regarding geotechnical 
uncertainty and allocating differing site conditions risk. In fact, the document states: “Ultimately, 
WSDOT will own responsibility for Changed and Differing Site Conditions.”    Since the 
geotechnical portion of a DB contract is the combination of information contained in the RFP 
and the winning proposal (Koch et al., 2010), the amount of geotechnical information contained 
in the RFP effectively creates the baseline from which a DSC is applied.  
 
Design-build Contract Pricing 
The predominant way that DB is procured in the public sector requires that the design-builder 
commit to a firm fixed price before the project’s geotechnical design is complete (Mahdi and 
Alreshaid, 2005). Thus, the risk of cost overruns for unforeseen geotechnical site conditions is 
increased since the geotechnical investigations necessary for each project will likely be 
completed after contract award, during the design process. Some public clients have the view 
that using DB shifts the full risk of differing site conditions to the contractor (Christensen and 
Meeker, 2002).  The basic flaw in this approach is that contractors cannot accurately value the 
risk of geotechnical uncertainty before a thorough site investigation is completed. If they are 
forced to price the risk, they will include contingencies that may either price themselves out of 
the procurement or, if they do win the contract, be insufficient for addressing actual conditions, 
further intensifying the bias to inflate the contingency.  Many sophisticated contractors will 
simply refuse to compete for a contract where they have unlimited risk of differing site conditions 
(Centennial, 2004; Loulakis et al., 1995), and 90% of the design-builders interviewed stated that 
the amount of detail available in the RFP had an impact on project quality. Following the 
recommendations made by Hung et al. (2009) effectively limits both the contractor’s and the 
client’s risk. The client only pays for the actual costs incurred if and when these conditions are 
actually encountered, as opposed to the unliquidated contingency for a problem that may never 
emerge.   
 
All of this creates potential risks to both parties that are not present in a DBB delivery process 
(Washington, 2004). In a technical sense there is a wide spectrum of potential geotechnical 
risks, but in DB procurement, there is only one: actual conditions will materially differ from those 
upon which the project’s price was predicated.  
 
Method and Methodology 
The researchers used qualitative comparative analysis as the overarching research method to 
leverage its ability “to blend the in-depth knowledge obtained from small-N studies of cases with 
the inferential power of statistical large-N studies…[and] determine causal relationships 
between ‘causal conditions’ (similar to independent variables) and ‘outcome conditions’ (similar 
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to dependent variables)” (Jordan et al., 2011). Specifically, the researchers conducting this 
study needed to compare case study contractor interview output with the output from a survey 
and the content analysis of DB procurement documents. Since the study topic was inherently a 
variable mixture of technical geotechnical engineering and the legalistic construction 
procurement process, this relatively new approach was selected to lend rigor to the research 
protocol. Three research instruments formed the study’s data collection plan. 
 
First, a review of the literature on DB contracting with a focus on geotechnical risk was 
completed. Both US and international documents were searched. The literature was then used 
to develop the content of an on-line survey of US DOTs. The survey questionnaire was 
designed using the principles prescribed by Oppenheim (1992) for survey questionnaire design. 
The researcher’s underlying hypothesis for the survey was:  
 
Geotechnical risk varies inversely with the amount of site-specific geotechnical 
information that is provided to competing design-builders during procurement. 
 
DOT Survey 
Since the research was sponsored by the American Association of State Highway and 
Transportation Officials (AASHTO) and funded by the National Academies’ National 
Cooperative Highway Research Program (NCHRP), the survey was issued to the members of 
the AASHTO Subcommittees on Construction and Design in each of the 50 US state DOTs. The 
subcommittee members were asked to forward the survey to the person best-qualified to 
respond from an overall departmental basis. Responses were received from 42 DOTs yielding 
an overall response rate of 84%. Table 2 shows the locations of the respondents and their 
positions at the time of the questionnaire. The table shows that the survey received responses 
from a cross-section of senior engineers with design-build experience. Design professionals 
made up roughly 60% of the response for those DOTs that use DB. The rest were either 
construction field personnel or DB project managers. Hence, the collective response from the 
sample covers the entirety of DB project delivery from planning through construction completion 
and administrative/legal close-out. 
 
Procurement Document Content Analysis 
The second instrument was a content analysis performed on DB procurement documents from 
26 states in addition to DB policy documents/guidelines from 12 state DOTs and 5 federal 
agencies. This type of analysis can be used to develop “valid inferences from a message, 
written or visual, using a set of procedures” (Neuendorf 2002). The primary approach is to 
develop a set of standard categories into which words that appear in the text of a written 
document, in this case a DB procurement or policy document, can be placed, and then the 
method utilizes the frequency of their appearance as a means to infer the content of the 
document (Weber 1985).   
 
Design-build Industry Interviews 
The final research instrument consisted of structured interviews with design-builders to validate 
potential conclusions and effective practices found in study. The Government Accountability 
Office method states that structured interviews can be used where “information must be 
obtained from program participants or members of a comparison group… or when essentially 
the same information must be obtained from numerous people for a multiple case-study 
evaluation” (GAO 1991). Both these conditions apply to this study; therefore, the tool is 
appropriate for the research.  
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Since geotechnical risk is often quantified in terms of cost, the above hypothesis was modified 
for the interviews to read: 
 
The amount of the contingency for geotechnical risk varies inversely with the amount of 
site-specific geotechnical information that is provided to competing design-builders 
during procurement. 
 
DOT Respondents with  
Design-build Experience 
DOT Respondents without   
Design-build Experience 
State Position State Position State Position 
Alaska Construction 
engineer 
Nevada Geotechnical/ 
foundations 
engineer 
Alabama Construction 
engineer 
Arkansas Design project 
manager 
New Jersey Construction 
engineer 
Connecticut Geotechnical/ 
foundations 
engineer 
California Design project 
manager 
New Mexico Geotechnical/ 
foundations 
engineer 
Illinois Design project 
manager 
Colorado Design-build 
project manager 
New 
Hampshire 
Design project 
manager 
Iowa Design project 
manager 
Florida Construction 
engineer 
North 
Carolina 
Geotechnical/ 
foundations 
engineer 
Kansas Construction 
engineer 
Idaho Construction 
engineer 
North Dakota Design project 
manager 
Nebraska Design project 
manager 
Indiana Geotechnical/ 
foundations 
engineer 
Ohio Design project 
manager 
New York Design project 
manager 
Kentucky Construction 
engineer 
Oregon Geotechnical/ 
foundations 
engineer 
Oklahoma Construction 
engineer 
Louisiana Geotechnical/ 
foundations 
engineer 
South 
Carolina 
Design project 
manager 
Wyoming Design project 
manager 
Maine Geotechnical/ 
foundations 
engineer 
South Dakota Geotechnical/ 
foundations 
engineer 
  
Maryland Materials engineer Tennessee Construction 
engineer 
  
Massachu-
setts 
Design-build 
project manager 
Texas Materials engineer   
Michigan Design-build 
project manager 
Utah Geotechnical/ 
foundations 
engineer 
  
Minnesota Geotechnical/ 
foundations 
engineer 
Vermont Construction 
engineer 
  
Mississippi Construction 
engineer 
Virginia Design-build project 
manager 
  
Missouri Construction 
engineer 
Washington Materials engineer   
Montana Design-build 
project manager 
    
Table 2 Survey respondent demographics 
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Since it is impossible to know exactly how much contingency is being allocated to the perceived 
geotechnical risk, the researchers asked the entities that are at risk in a DB project for both the 
geotechnical design and the final project’s construction to describe the impact on the proposed 
project contingency of the amount of geotechnical information that is available at the time a firm, 
fixed price must be submitted. The interviews were treated in the same manner as summary 
case studies because each set of interviewees had a unique perspective that was formed by the 
market in which it competed. Two primary criteria were established for selecting a design-
builder. First, the specific firm had to be one that had completed a DB project in at least one of 
the states that responded to the questionnaire. Secondly, it needed to have competed for at 
least one of the DB projects represented in the procurement document content analysis. Two 
secondary criteria were established for further filtering the pool of potential DB firms that 
qualified by the primary criteria, and those were to present a reasonably broad distribution of 
firms geographically and to have a sample that included small as well as large DB firms. 
Ultimately, interviews of 11 design-builders whose markets encompass over 30 states were 
conducted. They ranged in size from a regional bridge contractor that only worked in Utah to 
three national firms.  
 
The following discussion reports the effective tools used by US state departments of 
transportation (DOT) to deal with the geotechnical conundrum described above and provides 
information on commonly used practices for managing geotechnical risks in DB projects. 
 
Analysis of the Survey and Content Analyses 
In traditional DBB construction projects, the design and construction are performed under two 
separate contracts. In many cases, the agency performs the design itself and then advertises 
for construction contractors to submit tender offers, termed “competitive bids” in US construction 
contracting jargon, on the construction documents. In DB, one entity takes on the responsibility 
for both design and construction. As a result, the agency on a DB project has less direct control 
over the day-to-day details of design development, as design is being done in conjunction with 
an awarded construction contract, which has fixed obligations to meet a schedule and a price. 
The analysis of the survey and content analysis strove to keep this fundamental difference in 
mind and seek effective practices that reconcile the design-builder’s need to design to a fixed 
budget and contractual schedule with the agency’s need to diligently oversee the geotechnical 
design process.   
  
Table 3 contains the results of the content analysis and the survey responses regarding the 
amount of geotechnical information contained in typical DB RFPs. The FHWA Report to 
Congress on DB effectiveness (Federal, 2006) differentiated between the survey responses of 
those agencies that had completed 5 or more DB projects and those with less experience. 
Using the FHWA study’s approach, this study’s results were split by the number of DB projects 
the agency had completed to differentiate between agencies that were relatively new to DB and 
those with multi-project experience. The table shows that experienced agencies furnish more 
information than inexperienced agencies. The literature exposed one possible reason for the 
difference. There is a school of thought that maintains that furnishing specific geotechnical data 
in a DB project assigns all the risk of DSC to the client, and as such guarantees a DSC claim 
(Loulakis and Shean, 1996). Table 2 would seem to support this notion since the inexperienced 
agencies consistently include less information than the more experienced agencies. Taking the 
WSDOT (2006) policy discussed in the literature review above with Table 2 and remembering 
that the design-builder will probably complete the geotechnical investigations as part of the 
design process leads to the conclusion that furnishing as much geotechnical information as is 
available at the time the project is advertised effectively mitigates the risk by providing a clear 
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definition of the site conditions at the time competitive proposals were submitted rather than 
hoping to avoid a claim by not furnishing any information. 
 
  
Geotechnical Information Included 
in DB RFP 
(in ascending level of detail) 
Percentage of the Total of 
All RFP Observations 
Percentage of the Total of 
All Survey Responses 
RFP Content Analysis DOT Survey 
DOTs with 
less than 5 
DB projects 
DOTs with 5 
or more DB 
projects 
DOTs with 
less than 5 
DB projects 
DOTs with 5 
or more DB 
projects 
Reconnaissance Report 3% 8% 0% 7% 
Geotechnical Data Report 11% 26% 7% 22% 
Geotechnical Summary Report 8% 13% 4% 11% 
Preliminary Geotechnical Design 
Report 
3% 21% 9% 11% 
Geotechnical Design Report 5% 0% 4% 11% 
Geotechnical Baseline Report 0% 3% 2% 11% 
Table 3 RFP content analysis and DOT survey results regarding DB RFP geotechnical content 
 
Managing Pre-award Geotechnical Uncertainty 
Uncertainty, by definition, is a lack of information. Geotechnical uncertainty is reduced as site 
investigations, test reports, and geotechnical engineering is completed.  In DB, geotechnical 
uncertainty is high during the procurement phase, and the client’s primary tool to mitigate risk is 
through selecting a competent design-builder with the requisite experience to complete the 
design and construction. 
 
Evaluation criteria are typically found in both the RFQ and the RFP, and can be expressed as 
standards for the qualifications of key geotechnical personnel, past experience on projects with 
similar geotechnical issues, and technical criteria for the proposed geotechnical design and 
construction approach. In the solicitation document content analysis, 37 of 46 of the project 
documents had some form of evaluation criteria for geotechnical factors explicitly listed in the 
document. Of those 37 projects, over two-thirds evaluated the qualifications of the project’s 
geotechnical personnel. Next, 62% evaluated the design-build firm’s past experience designing 
and building projects with similar geotechnical requirements. Slightly over one-third included 
geotechnical evaluation criteria in the technical and/or price evaluation plan. In the survey, 94% 
of experienced and 53% of inexperienced respondents evaluated the qualifications of the 
design-builder’s project geotechnical personnel. Past geotechnical experience was rated at 65% 
and 33% respectively. In 53% of the experienced DOT responses local experience was also 
rated with only 20% of the inexperienced DOTs asking for that information. This data leads to 
the conclusion that evaluating the geotechnical-specific qualifications, experience, and technical 
approach is an effective means to manage pre-award geotechnical risk by requiring well-
qualified personnel, firms with a record of successfully completing DB projects with geotechnical 
issues, and an understanding of the design-builder’s approach to solving geotechnical issues 
prior to DB contract award. 
 
Allowing alternative technical concepts (ATC) to be proposed is a third method for dealing with 
pre-award geotechnical risk. ATCs furnish a means to “seek innovation from the private sector 
to reduce project costs and add technical enhancements” (Papernik and Farkas, 2011) without 
giving up control of the design process. Figure 1 is a compilation of the results from each 
research instrument. The fact that 71% of the experienced agencies included geotechnical 
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ATCs in their DB projects testifies to the effectiveness of this particular practice. An Australian 
study found that the “road industry had the greatest propensity to invest in [research]… [and 
was] able to expertly judge the value of innovation ideas proposed by the industry” (Manley and 
McFallan, 2006), which validates the US observations in Figure 1. ATC procedures typically 
include the use of confidential “one-on-one” meetings with each competitor where, in addition to 
offering ATCs, the DB team can also seek clarifications of RFP content. These meeting are 
called “proprietary meetings” by some agencies that permit competing design-builders to clarify 
RFP intent and ask questions that might lead to the submission of an ATC. The overall effect of 
meetings is to reduce the uncertainty with regard to interpreting geotechnical evaluation criteria 
and to permit the design-builders to offer solutions to geotechnical design problems with which 
they are more confident. In theory, this process should lead to reduced contingencies in the 
price (Christensen and Meeker, 2002).  
 
 
Figure 1 Research instrument output regarding alternative technical concept use 
 
An example of just how valuable the confidential ATC process can be was found in a DB project 
in Minnesota. This particular project involved replacing a bridge over the Mississippi River at 
Hastings. The foundation on the north side of the river rested on extremely poor alluvial soils 
that resulted in the need to jack the existing bridge up nearly 46 centimetres over its 30-year 
service life (Molenaar et al. 2012). The original engineer’s estimate was about US$220.0 million. 
The DB RFP for the project included a “performance criterion of less than 2 inches [5 
centimetres] of total settlement complete within three months of embankment construction” 
(Minnesota, 2010). The winning DB contractor proposed a confidential ATC to found the north 
approach on a “column-supported fill,” a technical approach that had not yet been tried in North 
America (Molenaar et al. 2012). The ATC also offered to furnish and install instrumentation to 
monitor actual settlement over time as well as a three-year, instead of a 3-month, warranty 
against differential settlement. The contract was awarded at approximately US$130.0 million, 
and roughly US$80.0 million could be ascribed to the reduction in geotechnical risk by the 
approved ATC (Molenaar et al. 2012). While this is an extreme example of using confidential 
one-on-one meetings with competing DB contractors to mitigate pre-award geotechnical risk, it 
0%
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59%
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Survey: DOT with < 5 DB Projects
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amply demonstrates that furnishing a mechanism where new ideas can be considered and 
clarifications to RFP requirements can be sought has the potential to accrue real cost and time 
savings to the public client. 
 
Mitigating Post-Award Geotechnical Risk 
The fact that US public transport agencies typically select DB to accelerate project delivery 
(Federal, 2006) limits the amount of pre-award geotechnical investigation an agency can do 
and, hence, makes post-award agency design approval a major hurdle to starting construction 
(Christensen and Meeker, 2002). Therefore, the geotechnical design package must be 
completed as expeditiously as possible (Koch et al., 2010), permitting the agency to reduce the 
impact of geotechnical risk as expeditiously as possible after award (Kim et al., 2009). Hence, 
the geotechnical design review process can act as either a barrier to releasing geotechnical 
design packages for construction or a conduit that facilitates the early discovery and resolution 
of significant geotechnical design issues.  
 
The literature review found that the number of required design reviews by the clients varies 
across the US. However, NCHRP Synthesis 376 (Gransberg et al., 2008) identified three main 
approaches, and its DB RFP content analysis showed the percentages of use: 
 
 No formal review prior to final (release-for-construction) design review (15%),  
 One review prior to the final design review (56%),  
 Multiple reviews prior to the final design review (29%).  
 
The fact that 71% of those projects had one or no intermediate design reviews prior to the final 
review is noteworthy. In those cases, the agencies still provided oversight and informal 
comments, but made a concerted effort to not delay the design-builder’s progress by imposing 
its design preferences for the project via multiple review and comment processes. 
 
In many of the documents reviewed in the content analysis, the design-builder is directed to 
request informal reviews that allow the client to provide more frequent input to ensure that the 
final design will meet the contract requirements. These reviews are often called “over-the-
shoulder” or “oversight” reviews to indicate that the design process will not stop to wait for 
comments from the informal review process. The primary issue when using this process is for 
the agency to demonstrate that it has discharged its statutory responsibility of “due diligence.” 
The Arizona DOT follows a procedure described as follows: 
 
“Over-the-shoulder-reviews are performed while the design is being developed. They are 
proactive in nature, informal, interactive, and intended to catch omissions and oversights 
that may lead to a major redesign of the work” (Arizona, 2001). 
 
Arizona also uses a design review procedure that is uniquely well-suited to geotechnical design 
deliverables. It is called the “early construction review” and is reserved for design product that 
will be released for construction before the design is 100% complete. “The intent is to ensure 
that enough detail has been provided in the plans to allow construction to begin and that 
ADOT’s minimum design standards are maintained” (Arizona, 2001). This process reinforces 
the due diligence requirements and allows the agency to obtain the necessary level of comfort 
with the design quality of early geotechnical features of work scheduled in support of achieving 
an aggressive project delivery period. Table 4 contains the result of the content analysis for this 
topic. It shows that experienced agencies are comfortable with the use of a non-traditional 
design process to supplement the final review. 
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 Design Review Types DOT  < 5 DB Projects DOT > 5 DB Projects 
Single or multiple design reviews before final 5 9 
Over-the-shoulder 1 17 
Optional early design reviews 3 12 
Table 4 Content analysis design review output 
 
The design-builder interviewees were asked to rate the impact of a number of components to 
the DB design process on the quality of the final constructed geotechnical features. The majority 
(67%) felt that the use of geotechnical performance criteria/specifications had a major impact 
and over half cited being given detailed design criteria also promoted design and construction 
quality. A majority cited multiple design reviews (7 of 11), sequential design reviews by different 
agency design personnel (8 of 11), and the agency personnel’s willingness to accept over-the-
shoulder design reviews (9 of 11) as challenges to timely completion that could potentially 
negatively impact quality on all DB projects.  
  
The required use of agency-mandated geotechnical specifications and design details on DB 
projects reduces the agency’s need to be involved during the actual design process. This then 
permits the expeditious review of geotechnical engineering products and facilitates the use of 
design oversight practices such as the over-the-shoulder review. The literature (Higbee, 2004; 
Christensen and Meeker, 2002; Papernik and Farkas, 2011) and the agency DB guidelines 
(Washington, 2004; Department, 2010; Arkansas, 2006) promote the concept that prescriptive 
design requirements in the DB process limits the ability of the design-builder to innovate. 
However, obtaining innovative design solutions requires the agency to spend the time 
necessary to satisfy its statutory due diligence requirements, which could potentially create 
schedule delay nullifying the benefits gained from the innovative design (Koch et al. 2010). 
 
Impact of Geotechnical Risk Management Practices on Project Quality 
All the above discussion is ultimately about controlling the quality of the constructed final 
product. The DOT survey and design-builder interviews asked the respondents to gauge the 
impact on quality of a list of project factors. Table 5 shows that both the clients and the industry 
agree that geotechnical qualifications and experience have the most impact. They also agree on 
the benefits of involving the contractor in the design process and the value of performance 
criteria. The major difference is the perception of the value of agency involvement during the 
proposal phase. This correlates to the use of one-on-one meetings to clarify RFP requirements 
and to propose ATCs. Obviously the design-builders appreciate the opportunity to ask questions 
and clarify ambiguities before they have to submit a lump sum proposal for a multi-million dollar 
project. The other disconnect regards the perceived value of geotechnical quality management 
plans. Again the design-builders felt the plans had a much higher impact on final quality than the 
agency respondents. Since these are typically submitted in part in the proposal and in full after 
award before work begins, the industry perception may be due to the fact that the review and 
approval process further clarifies and quantifies the clients’ expectations with regard to final 
geotechnical requirements. The results of this analysis lead to the conclusion that the use of 
proposal phase one-on-one discussions and post-award development and agreement on quality 
management plans are effective geotechnical risk management practices. In essence, the 
analysis argues that the geotechnical quality management system be similar to that used in 
DBB and probably different than the quality management system that will apply to the rest of the 
DB project. 
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Research Instrument DOT Survey Design-builder Interviews 
Factor 
Very/High 
Impact 
Some/ 
Slight 
Impact 
No 
Impact 
Very/High 
Impact 
Some/ 
Slight 
Impact 
No 
Impact 
Qualifications of the Design-
Builder’s geotechnical staff 
89% 11% 0% 91% 9% 0% 
Design-Builder’s past geotechnical 
project experience 
85% 15% 0% 82% 18% 0% 
Agency interactivity with 
geotechnical design team during 
proposal phase 
26% 48% 26% 73% 27% 0% 
Early contractor involvement in 
geotechnical design 
63% 37% 0% 73% 27% 0% 
Use of geotechnical performance 
criteria/specifications 
67% 19% 15% 64% 36% 0% 
Level of agency involvement in the 
geotechnical QA process 
37% 56% 7% 55% 45% 0% 
Use of agency specifications and/or 
design details 
67% 33% 0% 45% 45% 10% 
Level of detail expressed in the 
procurement documents 
63% 33% 4% 45% 45% 10% 
Quality management plans 41% 56% 4% 82% 18% 0% 
Warranty provisions 22% 48% 30% 18% 55% 27% 
Table 5 Impact on final project quality 
 
Comments and Conclusions 
The study sought to answer research questions on managing pre-award geotechnical risk and 
mitigating/retiring that risk expeditiously after award. The survey, the content analyses, the 
interviews, and the literature provided a rich source of information from which to draw 
conclusions and answer the research questions.  
 
Experience has shown that the most effective approach to managing pre-award risk is to 
conduct a thorough geotechnical investigation before awarding the construction. However, the 
combination of pressure to expedite project delivery by the federal government and financial 
incentives to implement DB increase the potential that state DOTs will tackle major projects with 
thorny geotechnical issues using DB. Ultimately, the issue becomes whether or not the client is 
willing to pay via the design-builder’s contingencies for geotechnical risks that may go 
unrealized. Therefore, the primary finding is a strong recommendation that an agency use 
extreme caution before selecting DB project delivery on a project involving high geotechnical 
risk.  
 
Given that recommendation, if an agency finds it must deliver such a project using DB, it must 
then aggressively manage geotechnical risk in an expeditious manner to achieve cost, 
schedule, and construction quality goals. To that end the following conclusions that answer the 
first research question are offered: 
 
 US DOTs consider DB to be an effective tool for accelerating project delivery.  
 Achieving an aggressive schedule requires that the geotechnical design be completed 
as soon as practical to avoid delaying the start of construction. 
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US state DOTs manage geotechnical risk during the pre-award phase through RFP 
requirements:  
 
 for well qualified and experienced geotechnical personnel;  
 by limiting potential geotechnical design solutions to ones with which the agency has 
previous experience.  
 
A number of effective geotechnical risk management tools were also identified.  
 
 Agency interactivity during the proposal phase had a high or very high impact on final 
project quality.   
 Communication with competing design-builders is enhanced during proposal preparation 
phase by using confidential one-on-one meetings to clarify RFP intent, resolve 
ambiguities in the RFP geotechnical data, and to present potential geotechnical ATCs.  
 Confidential ATCs create a mechanism for competing design-builders to clarify the 
magnitude of the geotechnical risk before quantifying it in the price proposal.  
 The use of risk sharing clauses that quantify in dollar terms the geotechnical risk a 
design-builder is exposed to with the agency assuming responsibility for differing 
conditions cost above that threshold was found to be an effective practice.  
 
In answer to the second research question, effective tools to retire geotechnical risk after award 
by expediting design review are as follows:  
 
 Minimize the number of interim design reviews before the final release for construction 
acceptance review of geotechnical design. 
 Maximize the use of both formal and informal over-the-shoulder geotechnical design 
reviews to resolve issues and concerns as they arise rather than stopping the design 
production by requesting a complete package and a period in which the design-builder 
cannot move forward until comments are received and addressed. 
 Permit the release of geotechnical design packages for construction before the 
remainder of design is complete to begin excavation to identify and resolve any differing 
conditions as soon as practical. 
 
The final effective practice is crafting explicit DSC clauses that permit expeditious resolution of 
discrepancies between pre-award and post-award geotechnical conditions. The research found 
that furnishing all the geotechnical information on hand when the project is advertised and 
building the DSC clause in a manner that makes it specific to the available geotechnical data 
rather than merely using a standard boilerplate DSC found in DBB projects was an effective 
alternative. 
 
The above conclusions are limited in their application to the US markets from which the data 
was drawn. Because there are significant differences in contracting laws and regulations 
internationally, the reader is cautioned against generalizing these conclusions without 
thoroughly reviewing the applicable legal environment in which the conclusions may seem to 
apply. Nevertheless, geotechnical risk is inherent to all projects regardless of location. Thus, the 
effective practices that relate to the expeditious review of geotechnical design product to 
accelerate the ability to begin excavation and determine actual site conditions as soon as 
practical could be generalised to all DB projects. 
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The conclusions do support a common theme regarding managing geotechnical risk in DB 
projects. The public agency can best manage these risks by creating an environment of 
information-rich communications with its industry partners before the procurement starts, during 
the procurement process itself, and after award of the DB contract. Clearly, there is no “magic” 
contract clause that can adequately absolve the public agency of geotechnical risk. Therefore, 
actively managing risk and expediting the identification, quantification, and resolution of 
geotechnical risk is in the best interest of the agency and the design-builder, as well as the 
taxpayer that ultimately must pay the bills. 
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